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the warranties stated in this section but no issuer may require an in-
dorsement guarantee as a condition to registration or transfer of a
security."]
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS,
CONTRACT RIGHTS AND CHATTEL PAPER
SECTION 9-103. Accounts, Contract Rights, General Intangibles
and Equipment Relating to Another Jurisdiction;
and Incoming Goods Already Subject to a Security
Interest.
(3) ... If the security interest was already perfected under the law
of the jurisdiction where the property was when the security interest at-
tached and before being brought into this state, the security interest con-
tinues perfected in this state for four months. . . .
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is
covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or any
other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate of title of any
security interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the per-
fection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction which issued the certificate.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mannhiem Auto Auction, 25 D.&C.
2d 179 (Pa. 1961).
An action of replevin was brought to recover a Chevrolet, which
had been purchased by one Robert Lorna in New York under a con-
ditional sales contract, which was assigned to the plaintiff. Plaintiff filed
within ten days in order to perfect his security interest according to
New York law (Uniform Conditional Sales Act). However, prior to
this filing, Lorna brought the automobile to Pennsylvania, secured an
unencumbered certificate of title as required by Pennsylvania law, and
sold the car to an innocent purchaser. Ultimately the car came into the
hands of the defendant, also an innocent purchaser for value.
The court held that plaintiff could not recover the car, basing its
decision on two grounds. First, it declared that under Section 9-303(1) a
security interest is not perfected until all of the applicable steps required
for perfection have been taken. Since all the required steps had not been
completed according to New York law until the contract was filed, the
security interest in the Chevrolet had not been perfected when the
Chevrolet was brought into Pennsylvania. Therefore, Section 9-103(3)
in regard to continuance of foreign perfection for four months would
not apply. Second, subsection (4), quoted above, clearly provides that
the law of the certificate of title state must govern as to manner of per-
fection.
[Annotator's Comment: Although in the Pennsylvania-New York
situation presented here the decision can clearly be based upon sub-
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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section (4), the views expressed by the court in its secondary holding
are of importance in a Code state which does not have a certificate of
title law, e.g., Massachusetts. In this regard, the decision is contrary
to the result reached by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Casterline
v. General Motors Acceptance Company, 171 A.2d 813 (Pa. 1961).
In that case, in an identical situation, the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania pointed out that, under New York law, filing within ten days
after the attachment of the security interest "relates back" and protects
the secured party even against purchasers prior to the filing. From this,
the court concluded that the security interest was "perfected" im-
mediately upon execution of the security agreement, but subject to
losing its perfected status if the contract was not filed within the
proper time.
Thus, it would seem that the decision in the Mannheim case is
incorrect in that, by its technical approach, it reads the ten day grace
period out of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act.]
SECTION 9-306. "Proceeds"; Secured Party's Rights on Disposition
of Collateral.
(1) "Proceeds" includes whatever is received when collateral or pro-
ceeds is sold, exchanged, collected, or otherwise disposed of. . .
(2) Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest
continues notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition . . . and also
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the
debtor... .
(4) In the event of insolvency proceedings instituted by or against a
debtor, a secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has
a perfected security interest
(a) in identifiable non-cash proceeds .. .
(d) in all cash and bank accounts of the debtor, if other cash
proceeds have been commingled or deposited in a bank account, but the
perfected security interest under this paragraph (d) is
(i) subject to any right of set-off; and
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the amount of any
cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the in-
stitution of the insolvency proceedings and commingled or deposited in
a bank account prior to the insolvency proceedings. • .
Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc. (No. 3),
25 D.&C.2d 395 (Pa. 1961).
The Girard Bank financed cars sold by Lepley Ford and had
filed a financing statement, according to Section 9-302, to perfect its
security interest in the cars sold and the proceeds therefrom. Lepley
failed to turn over the proceeds from some of the car sales to Girard,
as agreed, but rather deposited the proceeds, along with the proceeds
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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from the sale of used cars which were turned in by the buyers in such
sales, in its bank accounts, one of which was in the Girard bank. Sub-
sequently, Lepley, drawing on its bank accounts, purchased twenty-
eight cars directly from Ford Motor Company. Upon discovery of
Lepley's conduct, Girard seized Lepley's account in the Girard bank and
petitioned for the appointment of receivers for Lepley.
In this petition, Girard attempted to establish a preference to
the proceeds from the sale by the receivers of the twenty-eight cars
purchased by Lepley. The court held that (provided there was satisfac-
tory proof) Girard could properly trace the proceeds from the sale of
the financed cars into the bank accounts and then into the twenty-eight
cars purchased by Lepley. The Code subsection pertaining to rights to
commingled cash upon insolvency would have no application because the
cars here were identifiable non-cash proceeds when they came into the
hands of the receiver.
The court also held that, where Lepley had exchanged motor
vehicles with another car dealer, Girard could trace his security interest
into the car received by Lepley. Although, in effecting this exchange,
Lepley and the other car dealer had given each other a check for .the
full value of the car received (as was customary among car dealers),
the transaction was essentially an exchange of cars.
Girard was also allowed by the court to recover all the cash re-
ceived by Lepley within ten days prior to the institution of insolvency
proceedings under subsection 4(d) (Subsection 2 of the 1953 draft).
This - relief was granted in spite of Girard's seizure of Lepley's bank
account with it prior to the receivership. Subsection 4(d) deals only
with the debtor's cash in insolvency proceedings. Since Lepley's bank
account had been seized prior to such insolvency proceedings (see the
wording of subsection 2 of the 1953 draft, quoted below, as to "subjected
to control"), the bank account was not affected by the limitation in
subsection 4(d). Rather, it would be allowed to Girard in addition to
the rights under 4(d), provided Girard could prove that it held identi-
fiable proceeds by tracing.
[N.B. This case was decided under the 1953 draft of the Code,
where the pertinent provisions read as follows: "(1) When collateral
is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of by the debtor the
security interest continues on any identifiable proceeds received by the
debtor except as otherwise provided in subsection (2)... .
(2) In insolvency proceedings a secured party with a perfected
security interest has a right to the cash and bank accounts of the
debtor equal to the amount of cash proceeds received by the debtor
within ten days before the institution of such proceedings ... but no
other right to or lien on cash proceeds not subjected to his control before
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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insolvency proceedings are instituted. Nothing in this subsection shall
affect any right of set-off which might otherwise exist."]
[Annotator's Comment: The court in the case at bar held that
the proceeds of the collateral could be traced into Lepley's bank ac-
counts and then into other cars bought out of these bank accounts,
but that the plaintiff must bring forth adequate evidence in order to
trace in this manner. For this purpose, Lepley's bank accounts must be
examined in order to discover what other cash had been placed in them
in addition to the proceeds of the collateral. In view of the Code's
preference for the "first-in, first-out" rule, as evidenced by its incorpora-
tion in Section 4-208, it would seem natural that the same rule be used
in connection with "tracing" here. Thus, the first deposit in the bank
accounts would be considered the first one withdrawn.]
SECTION 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal of Col-
lateral.
(2) A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not in
all the places required by this section is nevertheless . . . effective with
regard to collateral covered by the financing statement againt any person
who has knowledge of the contents of such financing statement.
In the Matter of Babcock Box Co., 200 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961).
Petitioner sold machinery to bankrupt under conditional sales
contracts, whereby petitioner retained a security interest in the prop-
erty. Financing statements with respect to these transactions were
filed with the Massachusetts Secretary of State and with the Registrar of
Deeds for Bristol County, but not with the City Clerk of Attleboro, the
sole place of business of the debtor. In the absence of such filing, the
seller failed to comply with the requirements of filing set down in
Section 9-401(1) (c).
The court denied the petition to establish a lien superior to the
rights of the trustee in bankruptcy, although it was proved that the
trustee had knowledge of the contents of petitioner's financing statement
at the date of filing of bankruptcy.
The court held that Section 9-401(2) "merely makes the lien
effective, despite the failure to make proper filing as to persons having
actual knowledge of the contents of the financing statements!' It does
not make the lien perfected; and, thus, the protection afforded the
secured interest must be governed by Section 9-301, which provides
that a lien creditor taking without knowledge of such an unperfected
security interest will receive priority over it.
Further, Section 9-301(3) provides: "A lien creditor . . . in-
cludes . . . a trustee in bankruptcy. Unless all the creditors represented
had knowledge of the security interest such a representative of creditors
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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is a lien creditor without knowledge even though he personally has
knowledge of the security interest." Therefore, the trustee prevailed as
a lien creditor without knowledge.
[Annotator's Comment: Section 9-401 makes express provisions
to avoid two possible errors which were occasionally made prior to the
Code. First, a partially improper filing has efficacy to the extent that
it is proper. Second, if one has knowledge of the contents of a statement
which has been filed in an improper place, this will constitute knowledge
so that he cannot take over an unperfected security interest under
9-301. This provision avoids the fallacy reached under some "notice"
statutes prior to the Code that an improperly filed notice could not
possibly give notice, even if the third person had actual knowledge.]
(Where a cited case interprets only a portion of a Code section only that portion is
set out.)
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